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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-POWERS OF EXECUTOR PRIOR TO THE,

GRANT OF LETTERS TEsTAMENTARY:-Testator's will was probated solely for
the purpose of passing title to the real estate involved. There was no request
for letters testamentary by those named executors in the will, it being alleged
that there was no personal estate necessitating administration.1 Six days prior
to the expiration of the statutory period for commencing such an action, plaintiffs,
creditors, started a suit against the persons named as executors for the purpose of
extending the lien of their debt against the land in the estate. The defendants
appeared specially to question the propriety of the action against them. On appeal
from the lower court's order requiring them to answer the suit, held, affirmed.
Defendants are executors for purposes of this suit, and must either answer the
complaint or renounce their right to take out letters testamentary. Cavanaugh
'IJ. Dore, 358 Pa. 183, 56 A. (2d) 92 (1948).
At common law, the authority of an executor to proceed with the administration of the estate of his testator was derived from the will.2 Accordingly,
the will being effective the moment the testator died, _it was entirely proper for
the executor to collect the assets, pay the debt and legacies--in short, to do
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anything he could do after the probate of the will, except to bring suit wherein
his derivative title was important.3 In the latter instance, probate was necessary
to furnish authenticated proof of title; but it seems clear, although incapable of
proof, that title to the personalty was vested in the executor before probate. 4 An
administrator, on the other hand, did not come into being until appointment
to the position had been made, though intermeddlers were likely t_o find themselves labeled executors de son tort, and thus held liable for the debts of the
decedent. 5 The modern concept of the administration of decedent's estates,
under which the title to personal property is deemed to be in abeyance until a
representative is appointed and has qualified, has radically changed the common
law with regard to the authority of one named in the will as executor prior to
his qualification as such.6 According to present day principles, the only logical
·difference between an executor and an administrator is in the method by which
persons are chosen to fill the respective positions. Yet the decision in the principal case and a few others of similar import would seem to indicate that a
nominee of a testator is not entirely without authority to act prior to his appointment by the court. Thus it seems well established that a nominee may bind the
estate by receiving notice of dishonor of a note which testator indorsed, 7 though
like notice to one subsequently appointed administrator would not bind the
estate.8 Aside from these cases, authority for the proposition in question is
lacking. 9 In case~ where letters have been issued after the occurrence in question,
the court is likely to rely on the more frequently used doctrine of relation, under
which the title of a.representative is said to relate back to the time of death once
he has been appointed, to validate interim acts by the representative.10 But
8

I WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 12th ed., 187 (1930).
See Brazier v. Hudson, 8 Sim. 67, 59 Eng. Rep. 27 (1836), where before
probate, the person named executor assigned a lease for years which had been owned
by his testator, and then died before probate or the grant of letters testamentary. The
court held the assignment valid, the will having been probated before the question
arose.
5
2 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 635 (1923).
6 I WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 590 (1923); 2 id.
652.
7
Schoenberger's Executors v. Lancaster Savings Institution, 28 Pa. 459 (1857);
Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 79 (1877); Drexler v. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143, 33 P.
773 (1893); Harris v. Citizen's Bank & Trust Co., 172 Va. I II, 200 S.E. 652
(1939). Cf.§ 98 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 5 U.L.A. 431 (1943).
8
Mathewson v. Strafford Bank, 45 N.H. 104 (1863).
9
Cases involving the authority of a foreign representative to act in a forum
wherein he has not qualified are not deemed in point for the reason that once such
person has qualified in one jurisdiction, title to the personalty ·within the jurisdiction
devolves upon him which remains though he leave the forum. Moreover, no distinction
is made in such cases between foreign administrators and foreign executors. The cases
involving a nominee's power to act decently in burying the decedent and in protecting
the assets of the estate, powers generally specifically provided for by statute, are not
included for the reason that where such authority is found without the aid of statute,
it is deemed that it would not be limited to the case of a nominee alone.
10
I WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 591 (1930). In
this connection, it is interesting to note that two rather recent cases decided in the
4
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where no letters have been issued on which to predicate the relation doctrine,
the principal case indicates that in Pennsylvania a nominee has some authority
by force of the will alone.
R. V. Wellman

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, involving a question remarkably like the one in the
principal case and arising under the same statute which necessitated plaintiff's action
here, reached the same result as was here reached, on the doctrine of relation. The
facts differed only in that those sued as executors had taken out letters testamentary
soon after the suit was filed. See Beckman v. Owens, 135 Pa. Super. 404, 5 A. (2d)
626 (1939), and Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Owens, 135 Pa. Super. 409, 5 A. (2d)
628 (1939).

